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related to the original performance, that the effect should be
treated as though there were a "performance" under the Act.
"The economic realities demonstrate that the CATV system is
in the business of selling television programs to the public." 71
The Court relied heavily on Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty
Co.,7 2 discussed in detail in the body of the note, which held that
"public reception for profit in itself constitutes an infringement
of the copyright proprietor's exclusive right to perform." 73 The
District Court in Fortnightly felt constrained to follow Buck, citing
the fact that in an era of technological development, courts must
be flexible in utilizing dictionary definitions. In addition, the
Court struck down the defense of an implied-in-law license for
commercial TV reception and distribution of a telecast performance. From the Court's point of view, the issue was not whether
an implied-in-law license existed, but rather whether the CATV
station should be allowed to profit at the licensee's expense-it
decided that it should not. It is interesting to note that in Buck,
the Supreme Court had pointed out that if the radio station had
obtained authorization to broadcast the copyrighted material, the
decision might have been different.7 4 A lower federal court had
held there was no infringement where the initial broadcast was
licensed.7 5 In holding that such an implied-in-law license should
not exist, the Court appears to have made a value judgment based
on economic realities rather than judicial interpretation.
The result in this case underscores the flexible approach
adopted by the courts in construing Section 1 (c) and (d) of the
Copyright Act.7 6 In holding CATV liable for infringement, the
Court in Fortnightly has significantly advanced the broad protective
scope of copyright law.

X
DISSOLUTION OF THE CLOSE CORPORATION

Conceived in practical business necessity, but born into the
restraint of existing corporate norms, the close corporation stands
today as a species of business enterprise finally achieving its
rightful place in the legal spectrum. The typical close corporation
is formed by several businessmen who otherwise would have
71 Ibid.

72283 U.S. 191 (1931).
73 U.S. CoxrsT., art. I, §8.

74 Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.,

283

U.S.

191, 199, n.5

(1931).

75 Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929).
7 17 U.S.C. § I(c), (d) (Supp. 1965).
The Court by-passed the other
charges made by the copyright owner under these sections and limited the
decision to the issue of whether CATV had infringed the performing rights.
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sought the partnership as the vehicle of their enterprise.
Ordinarily their intended scope of business is relatively limited.
The management of the close corporation is dominated by the
personal relationships among the shareholders, and usually management and ownership are substantially identical. Shareholders
both finance and operate the venture, and are responsible only to
fellow shareholders. The skill and personality of each shareholder
is of considerable importance to every other shareholder, since
their relationship is very much like a partnership.1 Although a
uniform definition is elusive, the close corporation has been
characterized for statutory purposes as one with no more than
a certain number of shareholders, 2 or one which does not trade
its shares on a public exchange. 3
Perhaps the most significant reason for which businessmen
choose the corporate form is that it affords them an opportunity
to limit their liability to the capital invested in the business. 4 This
characteristic of the corporate form permits immunization of personal fortunes from creditors, while in a partnership, under existing law, liability remains personal if the partnership assets do
not satisfy claims.5 Equally advantageous is the continuity of the
corporate life 6 as compared with the automatic dissolution of a
partnership upon the death or retirement of one of its members. 7
favoring incorporation is the tax benefit
A third consideration
8
which accrues.

The corporate form, however, contains many disadvantages
which arise from the personal nature of the close corporation.
These discommodities are embodied in the proverbial "corporate
norms," perhaps the most onerous of which is that requiring the
democratic management of corporate affairs by which majority
rule is exercised through both a board of directors and the shareholders.' This standard is perfectly suited to a large corporation
1 See Hoffman, New Horizons for the Close Corporation in New York
Under Its New Business Corporation Law, 28 BROoxLYN L. REv. 1-2
(1961); Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CoRNr. L.Q.
488 (1948) ; Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence-Problems
of Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. CH. L. REv. 778 (1952); Symposium
on the
2 Close Corporation, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 345-46 (1952).
INT. R-V. CODE of 1954, § 1371(a) (1).
S FLA. STAT. AxN. §608.0100(2) (Supp. 1965); see N.Y. Bus. CoRP.
LAW § 620(c) (hereinafter cited as BCL).
4E.g., N.C. Gmr. STAT. §55-58(e) (1965); see BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 1, 2 (rev. ed. 1946).
PARTiERSHIP AcT § 15 (here5 N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 26; UmFmo
inafter cited U.P.A.).
6E.g., BCL §202(a) (1).
7N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 62; U.P.A. § 31.
8 See Spnnposium on the Close Corporation, supra note 1, at 355-61.
9 See Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence-Problems
of Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. CL L. REv. 778-79 (1952).
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whose numerous owners desire such protection, but it is unrealistic for small businesses where owners seek the control aspects of
the partnership, including the power of veto. 0 For example, in
the case of a close corporation, statutory schemes providing for
majority control facilitate the "freezing out" of the minority shareholders. By the adoption of structural changes, issuance of new
shares, refusal to declare dividends, or the alteration of voting
rights, a minority shareholder, with no extra-corporate bargaining
power, and no market for his stock, stands open to substantial
loss. 1 '

The majority of states have but one statute which governs
However, the legislatures of several
all types of corporations.
states have made major advances in recognizing and solving the
problems, and in accommodating the special needs of the close
corporation. Florida has progressed the furthest in that it has
12
enacted legislation pertaining solely to the close corporate entity.
North Carolina has generally been credited with being the first
1 3
state to extend statutory recognition to the close corporation.
However, since New York has closely followed its lead, the laws
of New York will be considered in this note with reference to
other statutes when they vary significantly from New York's
Business Corporation Law (hereinafter referred to as BCL).
The legislative reforms, while permitting close partnershiplike management, have done little in advancing the equally realistic
application of the dissolution features of the partnership. Partnership dissolution can be judicially obtained when circumstances
render it equitable, and it can always be at the will of any
partner regardless of whether the partnership agreement is
violated.24 If the agreement is breached, the partner who violates
This relationship
it is liable in damages to his fellow partner(s).
Winer, Proposing a New York "Close Corporation Law", 28
L.Q. 313, 315 (1943).
112 See Kohler v. Kohler, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
1 Fr. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.0100-.0107 (Supp. 1965).
13 Folk, Revisiting The North Carolina Corporation Law: The Robinson
Treatise Reviewed And The Statute Reconsidered, 43 N.C.L. REv. 768,
864 (1965).
.4 N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW §§ 62, 63; U.P.A. §§ 30, 31.
"It could be argued that there is even more reason for permitting dissolution of a close corporation by the will of any shareholder. In a partnership each partner presumably is receiving a salary
or a percentage of the profits; unlike a minority shareholder he is
assured continuing economic benefit from the association. Therefore,
if dissolution of a partnership is nevertheless permitted, it should be
permitted in the close corporation where a shareholder's connection
with the enterprise may be entirely valueless." Symposium on the
Close Corporation,supra note 1, at 411.
'15 Burnstine v. Geist, 257 App. Div. 792, 15 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1st Dep't
1928). See N.Y. PARTN SHIP LAw § 62(2); U.P.A. § 31(2).
1oSee

CoDRELL

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.. 41

is essentially of a personal character and is based on mutual
confidence and cooperation. An action to compel performance
of the agreement will, therefore, be refused.
The parallel between a partnership and a close corporation is quite obvious.
Nevertheless, reforms with reference to the close corporation generally have been limited to the correction of the problems arising
from greater than majority, or qualified majority rule.
In regard to the operation of the close corporation, the
"partners" will wish to secure for themselves a share of the profits
and avoid a "freeze-out."
Shareholder agreements to this end,
traditionally frowned upon,17 have received legislative sanction
in Section 620(b) of the BCL. This section permits the close
corporation to encroach upon the formerly inviolate discretion
and power of the board of directors in managing the enterprise.
By provision in the charter, certain functions may be transferred
to the shareholders. Such a provision must be agreed upon
by all incorporators or holders of all outstanding shares, voting
and non-voting, and notice is required on the face of the shares
to assure that subsequent shareholders will be informed of the
restrictions. It is further conditioned upon the continued close
holding of the shares. To this end, trading of shares on a national
exchange is proscribed.
Provisions for greater than majority stockholder quorum and
voting requirements,'
and for greater than majority director
quorum and voting requirements, 9 although not new, decidedly
give the minority shareholder a more partnership-like control over
the operation of the business.
Coinciding with greater minority voice in corporate government has been the increased danger of stalemate-induced corporate
16Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U.S. 328, 335 (1897)
(dictum); accord,
Lumley v. Wagner, 1 DeG. M. & G. 604, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (1852).
17 McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934).
In this
case, defendant, a minority shareholder, by agreement among all shareholders
was to be a corporate officer and receive a fixed salary. Eventually, he was
voted out of office due to a disagreement. The Court refused specific
performance of the contract. See also Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New
Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633 (1948); Manson v.
Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1919). While such agreements which
had the effect of limiting the discretion of the directors were held to be
void, agreements among shareholders as to the manner of voting shares were
not proscribed. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v.
Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Manson v. Curtis,
supra at 319-20, 119 N.E. at 561 (dictum); see BCL § 620(a); N.C. GmF.
STAT. §55-73(a)
(1965); Hoffman, supra note 1, at 5-12; see generally
Delaney, The Corporate Director: Can His Hands Be Tied In Advance,
50 CoLum. L. Rav. 52 (1950); Robinson, "Shareholders" Agreements" and
the Statutory Norm, 43 CoRNElL L.Q., 68 (1957).
18 BCL § 616; see Hoffman, supra note 1, at 3-5.
19 BCL § 709; see Hoffman, supra note 1, at 3-5.
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miscarriage. Consequently, liberalization of dissolution provisions
of corporation law became necessary to relieve stifling deadlock
situations.20 In the case of deadlock, prior law provided for
dissolution upon the application, by fifty per cent of the shareholders, to a court exercising equitable jurisdiction 2
However,
through the restricted exercise of its discretionary power, for which
sanction was found in the statute, 22 the courts accurately reflected
the image of the "sacred cow of corporate existence." In the
Matter of Cantelmo,23 typical of this attitude, was a dissolution
action wherein a fifty per cent shareholder-petitioner alleged
deadlock. The petition was denied not only because all shareholders were not benefited (each received $25,000 salary), but also
because the petitioner was actually acting for his own
benefit in
24
seeking complete control of the corporation's business.
In the Matter of Radorn & Neidorff, Inc.2 5 took a somewhat more extreme position in dismissing the petition of a deadlocked fifty per cent shareholder. Because the corporation had
average annual earnings of $71,000 and had sufficient assets, the
petition was dismissed in spite of hopeless and irreconcilable deadlock in management, as well as other serious disputes causing inability to elect directors. Benefit to the shareholders and absence
of injury to the public were deemed to preclude judicially imposed death. Dissolution would be granted only when management was not efficient and when the corporate objective, presumably monetary, was frustrated. 28 The Radom holding was
controlling authority until the BCL.
From these cases, it appears that prior to the B CL, a profitably run business would not be dissolved merely for dissent. The
only benefits which the court considered were pecuniary ones.
It disregarded the obvious burden imposed upon a shareholder
desirous of ending an unsatisfactory personal relationship. Unable
to sell shares on an open market, a situation which is the rule
in the case of a close corporation, 27 the shareholder was forced
Israels, sipra note 9, at 793.
N.Y. GEN. Corp. LAw § 103; Petition of Williamson, 85 N.Y.S.2d
93 22
(Sup. Ct. 1948).
N.Y. Gsn. CoRp. LAw § 117. "If . . . it shall appear .. . that a
dissolution will be beneficial to the stockholders . ..and not injurious to
the public, the court must make a final order dissolving the corporation.
20
21

23 275 App. Div. 231, 88 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1st Dep't 1949).
24 Matter of Cantelmo,

275 App. Div. 231, 233, 88 N.Y.S.2d 604, 606

(1st Dep't 1949).

(1st Dep't 1950).
25 307 N.Y.
2
6 Id.at 7,

Petition of Adler, 277 App. Div. 861, 98 N.Y.S.2d 383

See Israels, supra note 9, at 784.

1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954).
119 N.E.2d at 565. See In re Clemente Bros., 19 App. Div.
2d 568, 239 N.Y.S.2d 703 (3d Dep't 1963); Matter of Milton Point Realty
Co., 13 Misc. 2d 277, 178 N.Y.S2d 151 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
27

See Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 500, 502 (1966).
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tO remain in a relationship which, but for the corporate entity,
I
would be unenforceable in a court of equity.2
Under the BCL's deadlock provision', section 1104(a), the
earlier requirement that the petition be brought by one-half of all
outstanding shares entitled to vote for directors has been retaifted.
It may be brought on any of three grounds: (1) board deadlock
resulting in inability to act; (2) deadlock among shareholders in
election of directors; and, (3) internal dissention. and two or more
factions of shareholders so
divided that dissolution would be bene29
ficial to the shareholders.
The'pervasive requirement that the shareholders be benefited
has been retained, while the provision for non-injury to the public
has been deleted.3 0 However, hareholders' "dissention -making the
continuation of the business unworkable and no longer advantageous
to the shareholders is, according to legislative intent, a reasonable
ground for dissolution.3 1 The proposed effect of the deletion
is to make clear, especially in a close corporation, that dissent and
the interest of the parties should not be overriden by considerations
applicable
to corporations in which the public has a greater
32
interest.
A further important change which appears to overrule Radom
'is found in section 1111(b) (3) which provides that dissolution
is not to be denied merely because the corporation is, or potentially
is, a money-making enterprise.33 This provision may also be used
to broaden the meaning of "advantageous."
Whether Radom is,
de facto, reversed remains to be seen. Benefit to the shareholders
-remains the paramount criterion. By the express intent of the
legislature, the court is still invested with the power to exercise its
discretion in allowing dissolution in order to "insure fairness to all
shareholders." 34 Herein lies the key to future dissolution actions,
i.e., the manner of exercise of judicial discretion.
The appellate division recently granted a dissolution in
In the Matter of Sheridan Constr. Corp.,351 a case governed by
prior law but decided subsequent to the passage of the BCL.
Two brothers, fifty per cent shareholders, developed such a bitter
anihosity towards one another that efficient management became
progressively less possible until, finally, managerial paralysis set
28 See supra note 16.
29 BCL §1104(a) (1), (2), (3).
30 BCL § 1111(b) (2).
31 Joint Legislative Committee To Study Revision Of Corporation Laws,
N.Y. LE. Doc. No. 12, at 67 (1961).
32 Id. at 69. Cited as examples of public corporations are banks, insurance
companies and public service corporations.
3 BCL § 1111(b) (3). See Hoffman, supra note 1, at 19-20.
34 N.Y. LwE. Doc. No. 12, at 69 (1961).
35 22 App. Div. 2d 390, 256 N.Y.S.2d 210 (4th Dep't) aff'd, 16 N.Y2d
680, 209 N.E.2d 290, 261 N.Y.S2d'300 (1965).
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in. The corporation had suffered losses since 1958 and the
situation continuously worsened. There was no alternative but to
dissolve the corporation. It is significant to note that the court
referred to the present Section 1104 of the BCL and indicated
that the impasse was one which fell within the purview of the
statute, i.e., an equal number of directors equally divided resulting
in complete frustration and standstill, with no hope of reconciliation
and no ground for agreement, and, with continuation of the corporation resulting in further deterioration of the situation. 3
The court in Sheridan relied on such a strong set of facts
in allowing dissolution that it would appear that if other courts
adopt its view as to situations for-which section 1104 was intended,
decisions thereunder would be barely distinguishable from Radom,
except in so far as they will no longer emphasize the profitability
of the corporation. This would appear to be contrary to the
implicit intent of the BCL which is to give proper recognition
to the problems of the close corporation. If the key to the courts'
future decisions lies in the determination of what is beneficial or
advantageous to shareholders, they might well keep in mind a
practical close corporation truism stated in an early case :37
[D]iscord and strife began to arise . . . . The parties lost confidence in
each other, and their . . . judgments . . . came into serious conflict ....
The trial court found . . . that the relationship . . . is such that there

can be no reasonable hope of future harmonious co-operation; that . . .
the property and assets of the company are bound to depreciate and
diminish, and that therefore it will be beneficial to all stockholders that
the company be dissolved. The mere ability of the minority stockholders
to resort to the process of injunction by way of remedying some of the
abuses will not bridge the gap now existing between contending factions;
nor will it bring about future harmonious co-operation; nor does it furnish
a more favorable view of the company's prospects. Quite the contrary is
true. Litigation of the character suggested intensifies the feeling between
the parties, and makes their relation even more strained. It is the common
experience of the business world that embittered litigation between factions
in a corporation tends to reduce the value of the corporation's assets.
It has a destructive and depreciating effect, which in some cases leads
to utter disorganization.38

The courts must, of course, consider the protection of creditors;
they must also prevent the exploitation of the less financially able
shareholders at a dissolution sale. However, when the corporation
-is a close one, the owners genuinely schismatic and third parties
adequately protected, the courts should give considerable weight
aId. at 391, 256 N.Y.S2d at 211-12.
Schmitt Realty & Inv. Co. v. Monks, 32 Ohio App. 405, 168 N.E. 213

37

(1929).

's Id. at 406-08, 168 N.E. at 214-15.
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to the desires of the shareholders as well as to the potentially
harmful effect of their feud on the corporation.
The partnership aspect of close corporation dissolution is approached in section 1104(c) under which a single shareholder may
present a dissolution petition but only after the shareholders have
been so divided that directors have not been elected for two
consecutive annual meetings. However, it is likely that the
courts will require the petitioner to satisfy section 1111(b)(2).
If the courts choose to strictly construe the dissolution provisions,
it will, no doubt, be most difficult for a single minority shareholder to satisfactorily establish that his petition will be beneficial
to all the shareholders. Thus, it will remain difficult for a minority
shareholder to rid himself of an unwanted relationship.
The North Carolina statute " seems to treat the problems
of a minority shareholder in a close corporation more realistically
than does New York's statute. At the suit of a single shareholder,
a corporation may be dissolved not only for deadlock of the
shareholders or directors, but also when liquidation is "reasonably
necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of the
complaining shareholder." 40 Under this provision, a dissolution
petition was held to be sufficient in Royall v. Carr Lumber
Co.,41 wherein it was alleged by a holder of thirteen per cent
of the outstanding shares, that, although the business was solvent,
it had not operated profitably for several years, and the continuation of the condition would result in a diminution in the
value of the assets and cause loss to the shareholders.
The
statute on its face purports to allow dissolution in less severe
circumstances, and appears more compatible with a liberal judicial
outlook. While New York requires benefit to the shareholders,
North Carolina would allow dissolution which would benefit, or
at least correct a wrong against, the complaining shareholder.
Thus, where a close corporation has reached an economic standstill but still manages a reasonable return to the majority through
adequate but not excessive salaries, and an inadequate dividend
to the minority, the victim of a subtle "freeze-out," the dissolution
requirements of the New York statute would not be satisfied.
In such a situation, however, the North Carolina statute could be
invoked to provide rplief.
Florida, in its new close corporation law, allows any shareholder, without a waiting period, to petition for dissolution in
event of a director-shareholder deadlock. 42 In addition, the shares9N.C. GEN. STAT. §55-125 (1965). See Latty, The Close Corporation
and the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. REv.
432, 447-50 (1956).

40N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(4) (1965).

41 248 N.C. 735, 105 S.E.2d 65 (1958).
42

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.0107 (Supp. 1965).
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holders are allowed to enter into any written agreement, whether
contained in the certificate of incorporation or not, relating to
any phase of corporate affairs which would have otherwise been
invalid as an attempt "to treat the corporation as if it were a
partnership." 43 By this provision, it appears that any "partnership" agreement, including one embodying the dissolution aspects
of a partnership, will be enforced by the courts. Certainly, a
minority shareholder is at least provided with the means of
to cause deadlock
obtaining and exercising sufficient voting power
44
sufficient to warrant involuntary dissolution.
The New York statute specifically allows for voluntary dissolution which permits businessmen, as in Florida, to avail themselves, through charter provisions, of the advantages of a partnership." Dissolution may, by agreement, be permitted at the will
of any specified number of shareholders or upon the happening
of any specified event. Not only serious deadlock, but mere
dissention, are among the conditions which may be anticipated.
Dissolution at will, however, is a feature peculiar to partnerships.
Florida's statute has the advantage of allowing a majority of
voting shares of an existing close corporation to elect to be treated
as such, 6 whereas New York requires unanimity,47 a serious drawback to the affected corporations.
In New York, however, Section 1008 of the BCL was designed to protect the interests of third parties. The section
allows the court to suspend or annul dissolution upon the petition
of the creditors as well as the shareholders or the corporation
itself, and permits the court to make "all . . . orders as it may

deem proper in all matters in connection with dissolution." Although intended as a recognition of the court's jurisdiction to
pass upon the validity of the authorization of dissolution and to
supervise the dissolution itself, 4" the section is broadly worded
and could be utilized by the courts to restrain the implementation
of section 1002 agreements.
Despite the liberalized statutory approach to dissolution, there
still remains a wide area in which the shareholders of a close
corporation are bound by the traditional restraints upon the corporate entity. Absent deadlock or partnership-like agreement,
there is little a minority shareholder can do to remove himself from
43FLA. STAT. ANN. §608.0105(2) (Supp. 1965).
Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-73(b); see Latty, supra note 39, at 438-39 for an optimistic outlook
on the section.
44 See Kay v. Key West Dev. Co., 72 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 1954).
45 BCL § 1002(a).
46 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.0100(1) (Supp. 1965).
47BCL § 1002(b).
4s 6 McKINNEY'S Busmzss Co oRATioN LAw § 1008, Legislative Studies
and Reports.
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his unwanted association. This problem can occur where the close
corporation was formed prior to the enactment of Section 1002
of the BCL or equivalent legislation. If the required voting
power cannot be obtained to amend the original certificate, the
minority is unable to take advantage of the new provision.
To this incorporated "partner," the "sacred cow of corporate
existence" is still very much alive.,
For such a minority shareholder to bring about dissolution,
the aid of a court of equity might be sought, but it is questionable
whether such aid would be available to him. Although equity
has long had the power to order dissolution through its discretion 4 9
the power has been traditionally exercised with the utmost restraint.
However, there is now emerging a trend toward treating the
members of a close corporation as a partnership inter sese, regardless of legislation.
Generally, the instances where equity has acted have been
categorized under three headings. The first is the abandonment
of the corporate function, either where the corporation has never
commenced business or has been inactive for a long period of
time. The court will act for a minority shareholder to prevent
diminution or dissipation of assets. 50 The second area, and the
one in which equity has been most receptive to the petition of the
minority, is when there is a failure of the corporate purpose. In
Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., the court held that the corporate
function was to provide a return to its shareholders, and in failing
to do so, the corporation was subject to dissolution. The circumstances causing failure consisted of fraud, mismanagement
and misappropriation of the corporate assets by the majority
The court characterized the majority as a
shareholders. 2
fiduciary who, by such practices, abused the trust imposed upon
it at the expense of the minority. The majority will not be
allowed to ignore the rights of the minority and continue the cor49
Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882); Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co.,
93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892).
See generally Hornstein, A Remedy
For Corporate Abuse-Judicial Power To Wind Up A Corporation At The
Suit5 Of A Minority Stockholder, 40 COLUm. L. Rzv. 220 (1940).
oSee Hornstein, smqpra note 49, at 226-27. See, e.g., Burg v. Smith,
222 Ala. 600, 133 So. 687 (1931) (ceased activity for five years with no
intent to resume); Central Land Co. v. Sullivan, 152 Ala. 360, 44 So. 644
(1907) (ceased to carry on business for fifteen years); Lind v. Johnson,
183 Minn. 239, 236 N.W. 317 (1931) (land holdings sold and no meetings
for several years); Lasley v. Walnut Cove Mercantile, 179 N.C. 575,
10351S.E. 213 (1920) (no use of corporate power for eight years).
Supra note 49.
52 See BALLANTINE,
CoRPoRATIoNs .§ 304 (1946).
Miner v. Belle Isle
Ice Co., rupra note 49, at -, 53 N.W. at 224. Accord, Bailey v. Proctor,
160 F.2d 78 (1st Cir. -1947); Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont
Coal Co., 64 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1933).
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poration solely for its own advantage. The third general category,
the forerunner of modern statutes, is failure of stockholders or
management to work together, resulting in deadlock or dissention.53
Relief was granted when dissention was so serious that ecpnomic
collapse would follow from the continuance of the management.
Although this rule applies to all corporations,5 4it has been held
to be especially applicable to close corporations.
The New York courts exercising equitable jurisdiction have
historically demonstrated a willingness to aid minority shareholders,
but only in cases of extreme overreaching by the majority. 5 In
the leading case of Kroger v. Jaburg, 6 a dissolution action by
minority shareholders of a close corporation, the complaint alleged
that the majority shareholder had increased his salary from $7,500
to $20,000 per year, despite business being so unprofitable that
the corporation was operating at a loss. Capital was being impaired
and it appeared that the waste and dissipation of capital and
assets would continue until they were consumed. No dividends
had been paid on the common stock. The court determined that
the good faith of the majority shareholder was a proper subject
of adjudication, and that any breach of trust presented a ground

for equitable relief.5 7

While previously it had been held that

majority shareholders violated a fiduciary duty by wrongfully
seeking corporate dissolution, 58 the court, here, concluded that bad
faith in refraining from dissolving a corporation when it would
be beneficial to do so constituted a breach of a duty owed to
the corporation and the minority. If, therefore, it could be shown
that the refusal of the majority to dissolve the corporation'was
for the purpose of obtaining the corporate assets for itself by
way of salary, rather than dividing the assets among all the
shareholders by way of liquidation, it was the duty of the directors,
53

Levant v. Kowal, 350 Mich. 232, 86 N.W.2d 336 (1957),; Moeten v.

Collins, 3 NJ. 382, 70 A.2d 159 (1949).
54 Flemming v. Heffner & Flemming, 263 Mic. 561, 248 N.W. 900
(1933).
55See Comment, New York Broadens Availability Of Involuntary Dissolution For IntracorporateOppression Of Minority Shareholders, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 697 (1964).
56231 App. Div. 641, 248 N.Y. Supp. 387 (1st Dep't 1931).
57
Kroger v. Jaburg, 231 App. Div. 641, 645, 248 N.Y. Supp. 387, 392
(1st Dep't 1931).
58
Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148
(1919). The Court of Appeals stated that when directors and majority
shareholders seek dissolution, it would have to be based upon the belief
that the interests of the shareholders generally would be promoted. "In
taking corporate action . . . the stockholders are acting for the corporation
and for each other and they cannot use their corporate power in bad faith
or for their individual advantage or purpose." Id. at 195, 123 N.E. at

152.
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enforceable by the court, to institute dissolution and liquidation
proceedings.
The New York courts have generally agreed upon the necessary requisites for dissolution but have not always been able to
agree as to when they were present. Allegations that the corporation is being continued solely for the purpose of benefiting
those in control at the expense of others or that the capital of
the corporation is being impaired by the majority's "looting"
of assets have generally been held sufficient to state a cause of
action.59 However, mere dissention is not enough for dissolution.
In the case of Fontheim v. Walker,60 the court held that the
decision to dissolve was obviously one for the majority where
there was mere disagreement. The court, in its reasoning, relied
in part on the ability of a disgruntled minority to "separate themselves" from the corporation. 6
However, such reasoning would
not be appropriate in the case of a close corporation where there
is no market value for the shares. Thus, the minority would be
relegated to appraisal rights when there is no readily available
market or when the market consists of antagonists.
In 1963, the New York Court of Appeals decided Leibert
v. Clapp,612 which was applauded as "removing the protection heretofore afforded to corporate manipulators who have had the astuteness to cheat minorities with restraint." 63 The petitioner alleged
that the majority shareholders were "looting" corporate assets,
enriching themselves to the minority's disadvantage and coercing
the minority to sell their holdings to those in control at depressed
prices. The Court held that the complaint was sufficient to state
a cause of action, even though the corporation had been making a
profit and had been declaring dividends. In addition, the Court
stated that such allegations as those presented went
far beyond charges of waste, misappropriation and illegal accumulation of
surplus, which might be cured by a derivative action .

. .

. Settled beyond

peradventure is the proposition that, in cases such as this, directors and
shareholder majorities--constituted . . . guardians of the corporate welfare
-are cast in the role of fiduciaries and must exercise their responsibilities
4
as such with scrupulous good faith.6
5aGross v. Price, 284 App. Div. 964, 134 N.Y.S.2d 649 (2d Dep't
1954); Fontheim v. Walker, 282 App. Div. 373, 122 N.Y.S.2d 642 (1st
Dept 1953); Lennan v. Blakeley, 273 App. Div. 767, 75 N.Y.S.2d 331
(1st Dep't 1947).
60282 App. Div. 373, 122 N.Y.S.2d 642 (1st Dep't 1953) (the corporation
involved was not a close one).
61 Id. at 376, 122 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
62 13 N.Y.2d 313, 196 N.E.2d 540, 247 N.Y.S2d 102 (1963).
63 Comment, rupra note 55, at 701.

4Leibert v. Clapp, 13 N.Y2d 313, 316-17, 196 N.E2d 540, 542, 247
N.Y.S.2d 102, 105 (1963).
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Having failed to fulfill its duty, the board of directors created a
"decisional vacuum" into which the Court placed itself.
Thus, no longer need it be alleged that the sole purpose of
the corporate existence is to benefit those in control; it is enough
that this be the primary purpose. 5 It appears that the standard
of fiduciary duty was reshaped, with more emphasis placed on the
motives of those in control and less on the outward effects of their
bad faith conduct."6
The effect of Leibert was an extension
of the courts' power to order dissolution in situations where majority
shareholders were obtaining a disproportionate share of the benefits
without causing an end to profitable operations.6
In a dissenting opinion, judge Van Voorhis, determining
that the proper remedy was a derivative action for waste and misappropriation, stated that the allegations failed to show either that
the capital was impaired by the "looting" of the assets, thereby enriching the majority stockholders at the expense of the minority,
or that the existence of the corporation was being continued solely
for the benefit of those in control.6 He regarded plaintiff's action
as an attempt to subvert the security requirements of a derivative
action. 9 Although Leibert did not involve a close corporation, the
holding as applied to one certainly adds impetus to the recognition
of a problem peculiar to a close corporation, i.e., sophisticated
"freezing-out" without the benefit of a public market and, as such,
the holding may be characterized as another movement in the
trend.
The advance of equity towards full partnership-like dissolution
reached its furthest extension in the 1965 New York case of
Kruger v. Gerth.70 The importance of the decision is found not
in the majority opinion, which is somewhat restrictive, but in the
minority opinions. The majority merely affirmed the opinion of
the appellate division,71 where it had been determined that there
was no evidence from which the elements necessary for involuntary
dissolution, i.e., looting and impairment of capital, or maintenance
of the corporation for the benefit of the majority stockholder
at the expense of the minority, could be deduced. The Court also
found no evidence to indicate that the defendant did not deserve
the salary increases and bonuses. It viewed plaintiff's claim as
65

See id. at 317, 196 N.E.2d at 543, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 106. See id. at 320,

196 N.E.2d at 545, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 109 (dissenting opinion).
66 Comment, supra note 55, at 699.
6
7 Id. at 701.
63 Leibert v. Clapp, mipra note 64, at 320-21, 196 N.E.2d at 544, 247
N.Y.S.?d
at 108-09.
69
See BCL § 627.
70 16 N.Y.2d 802, 210 N.E.2d 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1965).
71 Kruger v. Gerth, 22 App. Div. 2d 916, 255 N.Y.S2d 498 (2d Dep't
1964) (per curiam).
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resting only upon the fact that the amount of the bonuses served
to reduce the net profit of the corporation, so as to leave an insufficient amount to provide a fair return to plaintiffs. The
court stated that it had found no case wherein dissolution was
granted on such a meager showing. Distinguishing Leibert, the
court observed that the plaintiff here made no allegation that the
impairment in the value of the capital stock served to coerce the
minority to sell their shares at depressed prices. It was also
noted that since one of the plaintiffs, all of whom had originally
received their shares through bequest, was a competitor of the
defendant corporation, possibly the real motive for bringing the
action was to enhance the value of this competitor's business.
Chief Judge Desmond, dissenting,72 found ground for reversal
on the authority of Leibert v. Clapp and upon the similarity of the
partnership and the close corporation, which, he declares, should
be treated alike in many respects by a court of equity. Here, one
"partner" had died. The corporation had once existed as an
enterprise formed and operated by the combined efforts of two
individuals and was formerly indistinguishable from the "partners."
Now it is being kept alive solely for the benefit of the survivor.
If the survivor were to pass away, no one would consider continuing the business. There was no profit, no growth potential and
no market for the stock. The only way in which all stockholders,
as such, could be benefited was through dissolution-looting was
not considered necessary.
This approach recognizes the separate corporate entity and
expands the fiduciary duty of the majority commensurate with the
nature of the relation, Two questions will be asked in a dissolution
proceeding in following this approach. First, is the business healthy,
not, is it dying? 73 Second, if it is not healthy, is its decline due
to the personal nature of the business? If answered in the affirmative, dissolution should follow.
Judge Fuld, also dissenting, 74 goes beyond the fiduciary principle and realistically views the parties for what they are, i.e., as
partners, but as partners existing "wholly apart from their corporate creature to the world at large." There is, he adds, "no
inherent reason why a court of equity cannot treat the participants
in a genuine close corporation, insofar as their relationship inter sese
is concerned, as they regard themselves, as partners or joint
72 Kruger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y2d 802, 804, 210 N.E.2d 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d
1, 2 (1965).
- Compare Matter of Sheridan Constr. Corp., '2

App. Div. 2d 390, 256

N.Y.S.2d 210 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 680, 209 N.E.2d 290, 261 N.Y.S.2d
300 (1965), where there were acute losses and demise was interpolated from the
facts.
Id. at 392, 256 N.Y.S2d at 212.
74
Kruger v. Gerth, supra note 72, at 806, 210 N.E.2d at 357, 263

N.Y.S.2d at 3.
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venturers." 75 Significantly, he endorses the analogizing of this
relation to a partnership at will."6
The court would, therefore, be able to direct the shareholders to vote for dissolution (and, if necessary, appoint a
receiver) upon any petition of a minority shareholder, not in
his capacity as owner of a corporation, but rather in his capacity
as a partner in a firm having as its chief assets the shares of the
corporation.
Judge Fuld has, by cutting away the form and reaching the
substance of the close corporate relation, exposed the relation
to another equitable concept, recently espoused as a solution to
close corporation problems, i.e., the refusal of the court to grant
specific performance of a personal contractual relationship.77 It
has been suggested that refusal to dissolve may amount to
specifically enforcing against the petitioner the respondent's version
of the relationship.78
Indeed, it is this very principle which
renders partnership existence so soluble and dissolution preferable.
Just as in a partnership based on personal confidence, the close
corporation can seldom be continued advantageously amid discord 79
and thus falls within the same rationale.8 0
If a jurisdiction becomes disposed towards acceptance of the
partnership analogy, it is faced with the perplexing question as to
whether society's need for, and benefits to be gained from, such
enterprises outweigh the potential harm. Essentially, the protection of limited liability would be bestowed upon the former
partnership. To carry the trend to its extreme would encourage
speculative enterprises to hide behind their parapets of limited
liability, unresponsive to their public and private responsibilities.
However, in a partnership, it is a sobering thought to partners who
act recdessly that their personal fortunes are jeopardized whenever
75 Id.

at 806, 210 N.E2d at 357, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 4.

Judge Fuld cites

DeBoy v. Harris, 207 Md. 212, 113 A.2d 903 (1955) and La Varre v. Hall,
42 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1930) as examples of the trend towards recognition
of a close corporate entity. DeBoy involved a breached pre-incorporation
agreement aimed at preventing a "freeze-out" of the minority-petitioner. The
court held that the agreement survived the incorporation and that it
rendered the parties, for the purpose of an equitable accounting, partners or
joint venturers.
70 Kruger v. Gerth, supra note 72, at 807, 210 N.E.2d at 357, 263
N.Y.S.2d at 4. See Israels, The Sacred Cow of CorporateExistence-Problem.s
of Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. CHI. L. RPv. 788, 792 (1952).
77 See 4 PomznoY, EQurry JuspRuDExE §§ 1343, 1402 (1941).
78 Chayes, Madame Wagner And The Close Corporation,73 HARV. L. Rnv.
1532, 1545 (1960).

79 See Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U.S. 328, 334-35 (1897); Lapenta v.
Lettieri,
72 Conn. 377, 44 Atl. 730 (1899).
80
Israels, supra note 76, at 789. "Deadlock or stalemate in a close
corporation is as completely socially undesirable as in a partnership or in a
marriage... " Ibid.
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they incur'debt or act negligently. Such partners will, therefore,
be restrained from "closing-shop" at the least suspicion of financial
reverses. Rather, the existing business, however limited, will be
preferable to dissolution so long as it tends to insulate the partners
from their creditors.
The trend toward treating the close corporation as a partnership for the purpose of operating the business is realistic, if not
advantageous, with respect to the protection of third parties.
But, in the desire to base a close corporation law on its own
assumptions, the concept of limited liability cannot be forgotten.
Just as corporate norms were formulated for big business, the
privilege of limited liability primarily finds its raison d'etre in the
same source."'
The courts of equity, most particularly, must
steadfastly recognize the rights of third parties. Piercing the
corporate veil in the face of proven fraud, s2 and appointment of

81 See Cataldo, Limited Liability With One-Man Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 LAw & CoNTumP. PROB. 473, 474 (1953).
The
reason generally put forward for limited liability is that the corporation is a
legal entity separate from its shareholders. See, e.g., Nettles v. Childs, 100
F.2d 952 (4th Cir. 1939); Coryell v. Pilkington, 39 F. Supp. 142 (S.D.
Fla. 1941), aff'd, 128 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1942), aff'd, 317 U.S.
406 (1943).
Under the theory advanced by Judge Fuld, limited liability
continues to be justified upon this rationale. Beyond this general rule,
limited liability finds its basis in the need for capital formation. See BALLANTiNE, CORPORATIONS § 1 (1946).
Without protection from creditors of
the corporation, an investor merely seeking a return on his capital would
be hesitant in buying shares. Upon this rationale, the necessity of limited
liability is not as obvious in a close corporation.' To extend the limitation,
a determination must be made that there exists a need for expansion of
small businesses. It is obvious that one would not be hard pressed to find
such justification.
From the point of view of third parties, limited liability is compensated
for by the size or by the potential for growth of other than a close corporation. Thus, the same determination of need is necessary. This is not
to relieve creditors from all responsibility in their dealings with small
businesses, but the possibility of fraud or mere overextension of credit
through
poor judgment cannot be discounted.
82
Accord, Bartle v. Home Owners Co-op., Inc., 309 N.Y. 103,
127 N.E.2d 832 (1955). See Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944).
"An obvious inadequacy of capital, measured by the nature and magnitude
of the corporate undertaking, has frequently been an important factor in
cases denying stockholders their defense of limited liability." Id. at 362.
Accord, Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. W.R. Grace Go., 267 Fed. 676 (4th Cir.
1920); United States v. Milwaukee Refrigeration Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247
(E.D. Wisc. 1905). Although a corporation is a separate entity, it is
well settled that "when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will
regard the corporation as an association of persons." Id. at 255. See
generally BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 118-42 (1946)..
".
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receivers in necessary cases 83 have always been within its power.
Statutory dissolution provisions are replete with protective sections.8 4
However, when the problem of dissolution comes down to a
controversy involving the personal relationship between individuals,
the court of equity should not presumptively refuse to grant relief.8 5
Borrowing from the law of partnership, bad faith can be compensated by damages in appropriate cases. "Flexibility of remedy,
tailored to all facts and circumstances of the case, including the
good faith of the parties on both sides, their conflicting interests
and motivations, if any, is the key." 8 86

See, e.g., BCL § 1202. See generally BCL art. 12.
8 E.g., BCL §§ 1008, 1111.
s See Kessler, The New York Business Corporation Law, 36 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 1, 64 (1961); Winer, Proposing A New York "Close Corporation
L.Q. 313, 333 (1943).
Law," 28 CoRaN
8
6Kruger v. Gerth, supra note 72, at 807, 210 N.E.2d at 357, 263
N.Y.S.2d at 5.
83

